‘Bunker mode’ is a far greater challenge for institutions than individual crypto holders
As crypto debates whether holders should move funds before AI or quantum advances expose wallet keys, custody firms face a separate problem: upgrading systems before an emergency migration.
Bitcoin developers are debating how and when the network will prepare for quantum computing. Also, the call for crypto holders to move into “bunker mode” before advances in AI or quantum computing expose wallet keys, bringing greater attention to individual wallets.
However, for banks and custodians, the harder issue may be whether their key management, approval and audit systems can cope as different blockchains adopt varying quantum-resistant security standards.
Project Eleven, a company developing tools to protect crypto systems from future quantum-computing attacks, and privacy-focused proof-of-work blockchain Quantus plan to integrate Quantus with Project Eleven’s institutional custody platform, the companies told CoinDesk in an email statement.
The two companies are targeting the first quarter of 2027 for support that would let institutions manage Quantus keys and approve transactions through hardware security modules, internal policies and audit systems.
The importance of this integration goes beyond a single chain. Bitcoin, Ethereum and other networks are unlikely to settle on the same post-quantum signature scheme or migration table. A bank that holds several assets may have to accommodate several new forms of cryptography, without weakening controls that govern who can approve, sign and audit a transaction.
Such a transition could prove an impediment to institutional adoption of cryptocurrency, Alex Pruden, Project Eleven’s co-founder and CEO, told CoinDesk via LinkedIn.
“Institutions are already preparing the post-quantum transition outside of blockchains,” he added.
Christopher Smith, Quantus’ co-founder and CEO believes AI is "accelerating everything, including both quantum hardware and quantum software."
"The tail risk of a surprise quantum attack needs to be factored into all portfolio decisions. It is a matter of fiduciary responsibility," he told CoinDesk
Smith’s and Pruden’s concern comes as developers work on plans to protect bitcoin and ether from a future computer capable of breaking today’s public key cryptography. Researchers and companies are increasingly treating the next few years as a window to prepare migration paths, rather than wait for a quantum attack.
Project Eleven's custody platform Strongpoint is designed to separate the institutional control layer from the signature scheme used by an underlying blockchain. In plain terms, a custodian could keep its approval process, hardware-based key storage and audit trail intact even if the chain adopts different cryptography.
“Strongpoint isn’t a replacement for protocol-level adoption of post-quantum cryptography,” Pruden said. “But the decoupled architecture allows us to support protocols in an agile manner.”
Quantus uses ML-DSA, a post-quantum signature standard selected by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology, for key generation and transaction signatures. Smith said institutions should regard a surprise quantum advance as a portfolio risk, not merely a technology issue.
The timing of quantum computers capable of attacking bitcoin or ether remains uncertain. But a network migration would require broad agreement among developers and users. While they debate, institutions are already preparing the post-quantum transition outside of blockchains to avoid an emergency migration scenario in the future, Pruden said.
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The article surfaces a structural asymmetry in crypto's quantum-readiness debate: while retail holders can theoretically migrate assets on short notice, institutional custody infrastructure—the backbone of professional capital deployment—cannot. Moving billions across legacy systems, compliance frameworks, and multi-signature schemes requires months of testing and regulatory coordination. A sudden 'bunker mode' scenario would expose custody providers to operational risk far exceeding individual wallet migration challenges, potentially freezing institutional capital at precisely the moment it needs liquidity.
This signals a critical dependency: institutional adoption has outpaced cryptographic infrastructure resilience. The largest holders—hedge funds, family offices, and corporate treasuries—are now tethered to custody solutions that weren't architected for rapid quantum or AI-driven key exposure events. Custody firms face a technical debt problem masked by market complacency. The real systemic risk isn't keys being exposed; it's the institutional coordination failure that follows, where custody providers scramble simultaneously to upgrade while managing regulatory expectations and client redemption pressures. This inverts the common narrative: institutions are more fragile than self-custodial holders in asymmetric cryptographic scenarios.